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SUMMARY & CONCLUSIONS 
 
Many systems operate phased missions.  The mission 
consists of a number of consecutive phases where the 
functional requirement of the system changes during each 
phase.  A successful mission is the completion of each of the 
consecutive phases.  For non-repairable systems, efficient 
analysis methods have recently been developed to predict the 
mission unreliability.  In the event that the predicted 
performance falls below that which is required, modifications 
are made to improve the design. In conventional system 
failure analysis importance measures, which identify the 
contribution each component makes to the failure, can be used 
to identify the weaknesses.  Importance measures relevant for 
phased mission applications are developed in this paper. 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The utilisation of many systems can be expressed in terms 
of missions which are split into a sequence of contiguous 
phases.  Mission success is only achieved if each of the phases 
is successful and each phase is required to achieve a different 
objective and use different elements of the system.  An 
obvious example of a phased mission is an aircraft flight.  A 
successful flight will require the aircraft to taxi to the runway, 
take off, ascend to the required altitude, cruise, descend, land 
and taxi back to the terminal.  Each of the phases in this 
sequence will require different sub-systems on the aircraft to 
function. 
Component failures can occur in phases where their 
functionality is not required and remain unrevealed until 
needed later in the mission.  For example, the landing gear 
may malfunction after the take-off phase.  This will be carried 
through the subsequent phases until the landing gear is 
required in the landing phase when the failure will manifest 
itself and cause mission failure. 
Difficulties in terms of the analysis of such situations 
occur due to three aspects: 
i) it cannot be assumed that all components are fully 
functional at the start of each phase, even if it is an appropriate 
assumption at the start of the mission. 
ii) failure in a particular phase needs to account for the 
successful completion of prior phases which will restrict the 
time period in which some component failures can occur to 
contribute to the phase failure under consideration. 
iii) when the failure conditions for a phase have occurred 
prior to the system entering the phase, failure occurs at the 
point of transfer to the phase not when the component failures 
occur.   
For a Risk Analysis of a phased mission the consequences 
of failure can also depend on which phase the failure occurs.  
Failure whilst taxiing to or from the terminal would be an 
inconvenience.  Failure during flight would be catastrophic.      
As with any system, phased mission or not, following a 
Risk Analysis the adequacy of the proposed design is 
appraised.  In the event that the performance does not meet 
with the acceptance requirement, weaknesses in the design are 
identified and improvements made to rectify the deficiencies.  
In conventional system Risk Assessments, importance 
measures can be predicted which provide a numerical 
indicator of the significance that each component plays in the 
system failure.  This paper develops an appropriate importance 
measure to identify the design weaknesses when the system 
operates as a phased mission. 
 
2.  PHASED MISSION EXAMPLE 
 
A very simple example phased mission problem 
consisting of non-repairable components A, B and C will be 
used to demonstrate the concepts presented.  The phase failure 
fault trees are illustrated in Figure 1.  The fault trees express 
the component failure conditions which will result in the 
failure of the phase. They could of course have occurred at 
any point of the mission up to and during the phase of 
concern.  During phase 1 which lasts from t0 until t1 the failure 
of either A or B will cause the phase failure.  Phase 2, lasting 
from t1 until t2 will fail if both components A and B have 
failed.  The final phase will fail if component C is failed or if 
components A and B are failed and lasts from t2 until t3.  If 
failure is avoided in all three phases the mission is successful 
and the probability of this is the mission reliability. 
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Figure 1.   Phase Failure Causes for a Simple  
Phased Mission Example 
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3.  PHASED MISSION RELIABILITY CALCULATIONS 
 
Fault Tree Analysis has been used to determine the 
phased mission unreliability for non-repairable systems.  This 
topic was first addressed by Esary and Ziehms (ref 1).  In 
2004, La Band and Andrews presented an efficient phased 
mission analysis method using Binary Decision Diagrams (ref 
2).  The approach adopted was to calculate the probability of 
failure in each of the phases, Qj, accounting for the successful 
operation of preceding phases.  Mission unreliability, QMISS, is 
then obtained by summing the failure probability of each of 
the n phases, as shown in Eq (1). 
∑
=
=
n
j
jMISS QQ
1
   (1) 
3.1 Phase Failure Fault Trees  
 
For each phase, j, a phase failure fault tree is constructed. 
This expresses the causes of failure in the phase under 
analysis, accounting for the success in the previous 1,…, j-1 
phases, and also the conditions for failure in the jth phase.  
This fault tree structure is illustrated in Figure 2.    
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Figure 2.  Phase j Failure Fault Tree Structure 
 
It should be noted that in developing this fault tree for any 
component failure event, A, to be in the failed state in phase j, 
the failure could have occurred in the jth phase or any of the 
preceding phases and so the basic event A in the phase j 
failure fault tree is replaced by A1+A2+…..+Aj (where + is 
logical OR).  As an example the fault tree structure for failure 
in phase 2 for the example illustrated in Figure 1 is given in 
Figure 3. 
 
3.2  Phase Failure Modes/Failure Probabilities 
 
 
 
Figure 3.  Phase 2 Failure Fault Tree Structure 
 
 Boolean reduction of the phase failure fault trees 
wilproduce the phase failure modes.  Consider the fault tree 
illustrated in Figure 3.  Eq. (2) establishes a Boolean 
expression (TOP2) for the fault tree giving the phase 2 failure 
modes (the negated term represents the conditions for success 
in phase 1 and the remainder of the expression is the failure 
conditions for phase 2): 
            
22
1212112 ).(
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BABATOP
=
=           (2) 
where: Aj is the failure of component A in phase j, jA  is the 
event that A works throughout phase j .  The notations can be 
extended to give the component conditions through a range of 
phases i to j using Aij and ijA for failed and functioning 
respectively.   More details of the phase algebra to manipulate 
the top event expression can be found in reference 2.   The 
probability of TOP2 produces the phase 2 failure probability, 
Q2 as shown in Eq. 3: 
        
22
.2 BA qqQ =         (3) 
In this case, the probability of phase failure is only 
dependent on component failure events.  When success 
conditions are also included, the probability function is formed 
using p to denote the probability of success events and q the 
probability of failure events, as for non-coherent systems.  
References 3 and 4 provide more details on forming the 
probability function.   
Considering phases 1 and 3 in the same way gives Eq. 4: 
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4.  CRITICAL SYSTEM STATES 
 
In order to develop component importance measures we 
require the concept of a critical system state.  For a non-
phased mission this is defined as: 
A critical system state for component i is a state of the 
remaining (n-1) components in the system such that the failure 
of component i will cause the system to make a transition from 
the working to the failed state. 
This definition is appropriate for either non-phased 
missions or the first phase of a phased mission.  As an 
example, consider the criticality of component A in phase 1 of 
the example illustrated in Figure 1.  All combinations of the 
states (working or failed) for the remaining components (B 
and C) are listed in Table 1.  Phase 1 will fail if either 
component B fails or A fails.  Since we are looking at the 
criticality for A it must be assumed that A is functioning and 
we test to see if its failure will fail a working system.  If 
component B and C both work, or if B works and C fails, the 
failure of A will fail the system.  Therefore, these states are 
critical for A.  For the last 2 states listed in the table, B has 
failed and therefore the system has failed and the failure of 
component A has no effect on system performance.  The 
probability of each critical state is given in the third column. 
 
Other  
Component States Critical for A Probability 
) C ,B , . ( 11  Yes )1)(1( 11 CB qq −−
) C ,B , . ( 11  Yes 11 )1( CB qq−  
) C ,B , . ( 11  No  
) C ,B , . ( 11  No  
 
Table 1.  Criticality of component A in phase 1 
 
4.1 Criticality Function 
 
This is also known as Birnbaum’s measure of importance 
(ref 5) and whilst being an importance measure in its own 
right, it is also the basis of several other importance measures.  
The criticality function, Gi, for each component i is defined as 
the probability that the system is in a critical state for 
component i.  From Table 1 it can be seen that (Eq. 5): 
)1(
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Constructing a similar table for the other components  
gives (Eq. 6): 
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5.  CRITICAL PHASE STATES 
 
For multi-phased missions the possible component states 
in any phase are dependent upon which failures have occurred 
during all of the preceding states up to and including phase j.  
A critical state for component i in phase j is a state of the 
remaining components through the previous and current 
phases such that the system is working in phase j and the 
failure of component i will then cause phase (and mission) 
failure. 
For this to happen: 
i) all phases up to phase j must have completed successfully, 
and 
ii) component i is in the working state at the start of phase j.  
If we consider a component A operating over two phases 
we need to identify all possible alternatives for this component 
which will enable us to determine its state and the probability 
of it being in these states.  Therefore we need to consider A1 
and A2 (failure in phases 1 or 2 respectively) or 12A  where 
the component survives without failure over both phases. 
As an example consider the critical states for component 
A in phase 2 of the simple phased mission example illustrated 
in Figure 1. The alternative states for the remaining 
components are listed in Table 2 
 
Other 
Component State 
Fails in 
Phase 1 
Critical for A 
in Phase 2? Probability 
) C ,B , . ( 1212  No No  
) C ,B , . ( 121  Yes -  
) C ,B , . ( 122  No Yes )1( 122 CB qq −  
) C ,B , . ( 112  No No  
) C ,B , . ( 212  No No  
) C ,B , . ( 11  Yes -  
) C ,B , . ( 21  Yes -  
) C ,B , . ( 12  No Yes 12 CB qq  
) C ,B , . ( 22  No Yes 22 CB qq  
 
Table 2.  Critical States for Component A in Phase 2 
 
The first entry in Table 2 has components B and C 
functioning throughout phases 1 and 2.  The next four entries 
consider a single failure of B or C in either of the two phases.   
Finally the last four entries consider all possible orderings 
where both of components B and C fail at some point in the 
first two phases.  The second column indicates those states 
which survive beyond phase 1.  The three entries where 
component B fails in phase 1 result in phase 1 failure and 
therefore cannot contribute to what happens in phase 2.  Of 
those states surviving phase 1 their criticality for component A 
in phase 2 is then considered and entered into column 3 of 
table 2.   As the phase 2 failure requirement is that A and B 
are both failed the three critical phase states are those entered 
on rows 3, 8 and 9 (where B has failed in phase 2).  The 
probability of each of these critical states is given in column 4. 
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5.1  Phase Criticality Function 
The phase criticality function for component i in phase j is 
defined as the probability that the system is in a critical state 
for component i in phase j, Gi,j.  For component A in phase 2 
this is (Eq. 7): 
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By the same process (Eq. 8): 
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Using the same approach the phase 3 criticality functions for 
each component are found to be (Eq. 9): 
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6.  EFFICIENT CALCULATION OF THE PHASE 
CRITICALITY FUNCTION 
 
The tabular approach presented above to calculate the 
criticality function, whilst demonstrating the philosophy of the 
method, becomes impractical due the size of the table as the 
number of components and the number of phases increases.  
However a simpler more efficient approach exists which is 
based on the phase failure likelihood function.  From these the 
phase criticality function can be produced by (Eq 10): 
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This can be demonstrated using the simple phased 
mission example. 
 For phase 1 (Eq 11): 
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For phase 2 (Eq 12): 
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For phase 3 (Eq. 13): 
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These agree with those expressions obtained from the 
table. 
 
7.  PHASE CRITICALITY IMPORTANCE MEASURES 
 
The Phase Criticality Function is an importance measure 
in its own right and indicates the susceptibility of the system 
to the failure of each component in each phase.  However, as 
can be seen, a component’s criticality function it is not 
dependent upon its own failure probability and is used to form 
more informative measures to indicate the contribution that a 
component makes to the phase and mission failure. 
For a system to fail it needs to be in a critical condition 
for any of the i components and also the (ith) component fails.  
If this contribution is then divided by the system failure 
probability we have the proportion of times that the failure of 
component i causes system failure, i.e., a measure of the 
contribution that component i makes to system failure. 
Putting the above concept into the context of a phased 
mission two scenarios are presented that can result in phase 
and mission failure: 
1. For any phase the system can be in a critical state for a 
component i in phase j and component i then fails during 
the phase causing phase failure. (Phase importance) 
2. Alternatively the failure conditions for phase j may exist 
prior to the mission entering phase j and phase failure 
occurs on transition to phase j. (Transition Importance). 
For a component i to contribute to transition failure the 
system is in a critical state for component i with respect to 
phase j in a phase prior to phase j and component i also fails 
prior to this phase. 
These scenarios give rise to two measures of component 
importance for each mission phase: 
Phase Component Importance for component i in phase j (Eq. 
14) 
j
i
i
j
j
ijiP
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q
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Q
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jj
∂
∂
==
,
,   (14) 
All parameters required in this importance measure have 
been established in the previous sections of the paper. 
Phase Transition Importance for component i in phase j 
Qj is the probability that the conditions for failure in phase 
j occur.  It accounts for the probability of failure during the 
phase and on transition into the phase.  To establish the 
probability of failure on transition to the phase the logic 
equations for the causes of phase failure need to remove any 
of the failure events which occur in phase j.  This is equivalent 
to establishing the causes of phase failure in phase j in the 
1…j-1 phases prior to phase j and can be achieved by 
modifying the right hand box from the top event on the fault 
tree in Figure 2 to be ‘failure conditions met prior to phase j.  
There is obviously no failure on transfer into phase 1 as 
all components are assumed to be functioning at this point in 
time.  For failure on entry to phase 2 the logic function for 
phase 2 failure, and phase 1 success, (equation 2) is modified 
to remove phase 2 failure events giving (Eq. 15): 
0Q    giving    0)( T211112 === BABATop
T  (15) 
Similarly for phase 3 (Eq. 16): 
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giving (Eq. 17): 
12121212121121123 CBACBACBA
T qppqppqppQ −+=  (17) 
The phase criticality function for phase j transition failure 
due to the failure of component i in a phase k prior to j,  GTi,j,k 
is (Eq. 18): 
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=,,    (18) 
Phase transition failure requires that the failure conditions 
have occurred for phase j in some phase, k,  prior to phase j 
but these conditions have not caused previous phase failure.  
This importance measure is the failure contribution that 
component i makes to the transition failure of phase j as a 
proportion of the total phase failure probability i.e., (Eq. 19): 
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8.  PHASED MISSION IMPORTANCE CONTRIBUTIONS 
 
The total importance contribution of component i failure 
in phase j is (Eq. 20): 
T
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P
jiji III ,,, +=   (20) 
A measure to indicate the total contribution made by a 
component i to the whole mission failure of the system is (Eq. 
21): 
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9.  SYSTEM EXAMPLE 
 
9.1 Phase Component Importance 
 
As an example consider the contribution that the 
components make to phase 3 of the simple example illustrated 
in Figure 1.   From equation 13 substituted in to equation 14 
gives (Eq. 22): 
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9.2 Phase Transition Importance 
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9.3  Example Importance Measures 
 
If the component failure probabilities are as given in 
Table 3, the system importance measures are given in Table 4. 
 
COMPONENT PHASE 
1 
PHASE 
2 
PHASE 
3 
A 0.4 0.3 0.1 
B 0.2 0.1 0.05 
C 0.1 0.075 0.05 
 
Table 3.  Component Phase Failure Data 
 
In terms of the system performance: 
Phase failure probabilities: Q1=0.52, Q1=0.03, Q1=0.1245 
Mission failure probability:  QMISS = 0.6745 
 
Component A B C 
In Phase 1 Import 0.615 0.231 0.0 
In Phase 2 Import 1.0 1.0 0.0 
Trans to Phase 2 Import 0.0 0.0 0.0 
In Phase 3 Import 0.093 0.125 0.159 
Trans to Phase 3 Import 0.0 0.0 0.6325 
Total Mission Import 0.536 0.245 0.146 
 
Table 4.  Component Phase and Mission Importance Values 
 
From Table 4 it can be seen that in phase 1 component A 
contributes most to the in-phase failure.  Components A and B 
contribute equally to in-phase failure of phase 2 and phase 3 
has contributions from all components with C, B, A 
representing the order of significance.  However the large 
contribution to the failure in phase 3 is on transition into phase 
3 this particular contribution all comes from component C. 
Over the entire mission A, B and C contribute in that 
order and the largest improvement in the mission reliability 
could be obtained by focussing on improving the reliability of 
component A. 
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